This paper analyzes stock option awards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-&holes approach, I test whether stock options' performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensation between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards.
Introduction
The enormous growth in top U.S. executives' compensation during the last decade has resulted largely from stock option awards. Fig. 1 illustrates average compensation levels for chief executive officers in 792 major corporations chosen for this study. Stock option awards, valued by Black-Scholes (1973) This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation. I thank my committee members, Gary Chamberlain, Kevin J. Murphy, and Andrei Shleifer (chairman), for many hours of counsel. I deeply appreciate the work of research assistants Jason Barro and Melissa McSherry. For helpful comments I thank George Baker, Jane Buchan, Benjamin Esty, Stephen Figlewski, Richard Freeman, Michael Jensen (the editor), Stacey Kale, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at Harvard and NYU. I especially appreciate the comments and encouragement of Eli Ofek. Chris Allen, Sarah Woolverton, and the staff of the Cole Room at Harvard's Baker Library provided data collection assistance, and more than 100 companies kindly responded to inquiries. I acknowledge financial support from the Harvard Business School Division of Research and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Table 2 . Compensation data is obtained from corporate proxy statements. Stock option awards are valued using the Black-Scholes approach based upon assumptions described in the text. Long-term awards (mainly restricted stock and earnings-related performance plans) are attributed to the year in which payouts are made or ownership restrictions lapse. Stock option awards accounted for 20% of CEO income in 1984 CEO income in , 35% in 1990 CEO income in , and 30% in 1991 methodology as of the date of grant, represented approximately one-third of CEO compensation in 1990 and 1991, up from one-fifth in 1984. While other forms of incentive compensation also increased during this period, the chart indicates that stock options accounted for the large majority of CEOs' income from contingent instruments.
This explosive rise in stock option awards has led to criticism in the popular media (see Crystal, 1991) and prompted requirements by government agencies for greater disclosure of executive compensation data (see Securities and Exchange Commission, 1992, and proposals in Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1993) . However, financial economists have reached few firm conclusions about whether corporations award stock options in accord with theories of financial contracting and agency cost reduction. Table 1 lists ten previous studies on the association between executive stock option awards and different explanatory variables.' As the table shows, these studies do not always agree ' Other papers have considered more limited questions related to executive stock options, such as how investors react when corporations announce the intention to adopt stock option plans (Brickley et al., 1985; DeFusco et al., 1990) and whether stock option award activity increases in the aftermath of market-wide stock price declines (Saly, 1994) . D. YermacklJournal of Financial Economics 39 (1995) 237-269 239 and, further, differences in time periods, sample selection, and methodology make their results difficult to compare. This paper extends the prior literature by studying stock option awards to CEOs of large U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a sample of nearly 6,000 CEO-year observations from all industries, I test nine leading theories of why companies award stock options to their top managers. Prior studies have generally focused on a small number of theories and treated stock options as a minor part of a broader investigation, By examining a wide range of hypotheses, I hope to offer a more complete explanation of CEO stock option awards. While Matsunaga (1995) also takes a broad view, his companylevel data does not permit analysis of how the option award process is affected by individual executives' characteristics, such as age, stock ownership, and tenure.
Along with results for a comprehensive set of explanatory variables from a large recent data set, my study contributes to the literature a new dependent variable for measuring the performance incentives provided by stock option awards. Prior investigators have struggled with the problem of finding an appropriate variable for this purpose. Eaton and Rosen (1983) and Lewellen et al. (1987) study the mix of pay between options and other compensation, but they value stock option awards with an ex post measure of the paper gains earned by executives, not with the modern Black-Scholes approach. Murphy (1985) Matsunaga (1995) , and Mehran (1995) use the Black-Scholes formula to measure the level of pay received from stock options, but they do not consider the degree of sensitivity between changes in award values and changes in the value of each firm. Smith and Watts (1992) , Gaver and Gaver (1993) , and Kole (1993) restrict their research to binary (0, 1) variables that indicate whether firms have adopted stock option plans, but do not take into account the frequency or size of awards under those plans. Only Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Bizjak et al. (1993) measure incentives by estimating how executive stock option award values are influenced by changes in firm value, but each of these wide-ranging papers devotes only a small amount of space to the issue.
To estimate the pay-performance incentives from stock options, I use a dependent variable based on the Black-Scholes formula's partial derivative on stock price, multiplied by the fraction of a firm's equity represented by each CEO stock option award. This quantity should approximate the change in managerial wealth in relation to firm value that arises as a result of each award. In addition, I attempt to improve upon the methodology of earlier research by using a Tobit econometric framework and including firm effects to control for omitted-variable bias. All prior stock option studies with continuous dependent variables have relied on ordinary least squares estimations. However, the Tobit approach seems more appropriate for the truncated distribution of stock option award data with its large number of zero-valued observations. Controls for Table 1 Previous studies of executive stock option awards Eaton & Rosen (1983) 22 firms Murphy (1985) 72 firms Lewetlen et al. (1987) 49 firms Jensen & Murphy (1990) 72 firms Smith t Watts (1992) 16 industries Gaver & Gaver (1993) 443 firms Kale (1993) 303 firms Bizjak et al. (1993) 418 firms Matsunaga (1995) 123 firms Mehran (1995) Eaton and Rosen (1983) . I use results from the model with industry dummy variables (Table 2) . For Murphy (1985) , I use the 'time-series' model including both sales and stock return variables (panel A of Table 6 ). For Lewellen et al. (1987) I use the model including executive stock ownership as an explanatory variable ( 'Financial Economics 39 (1995) 237-269 omitted variables are absent from all previous studies except Murphy (1985) , who allows regression intercepts to vary for each executive? My results indicate that few theories based in the agency or financial contracting literature have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards. In testing the nine hypotheses advanced by compensation theorists, I find evidence to support only three propositions: that companies in highly regeglated industries are less likely to use stock options as a source of managerial incentives; that firms provide their CEOs with greater incentives through stock options when accounting earnings contain large amounts of 'noise', making managers difficult to monitor; and that corporations facing internal liquidity problems shift the mix of executive pay away from cash salaries and bonuses and toward stock options. However, these results are subject to qualifications discussed below. Hypotheses not supported by my analysis include conjectures that stock option incentives are decreased when CEOs hold large fractions of their own firms' equity; that stock options are used as incentives for CEOs nearing retirement to motivate them to maintain high levels of investment; that stock option incentives are larger in firms with valuable growth opportunities; that stock option incentives are decreased as financial leverage increases, reflecting attempts by firms to reduce agency costs of debt; that corporations with low marginal tax rates pay a greater proportion of compensation in stock options; and that stock options are used as substitutes for cash compensation when corporations face high implicit costs of reporting low profitability.
Collectively, the results support two interpretations: that most corporations do not follow optimal compensation practices, or that financial economists' theories of optimal compensation contracts are incomplete or incorrect. A further possibility is that the data and methodology for this study have inadequate power for measuring managerial incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theories of why corporations award executive stock options and develops specific hypotheses for testing. Section 3 describes the sample selection and data used in this study. Section 4 discusses the estimation approach, including specification of the dependent variables and the choice of Tobit maximum likelihood framework. Section 5 presents results of the estimations. Section 6 contains a discussion and conclusions.
Theories and hypotheses
My major hypothesis is that boards of directors use stock options to increase CEOs' pay-performance sensitivities when expected agency costs are high. 2Matsunaga (1995) discusses having estimated both Tobit models and regressions with firm-specific intercepts, but he does not report results.
Secondary hypotheses are that stock option awards are influenced by considerations of financial liquidity, tax reduction, and implicit financial reporting costs. The following subsections present specific theories related to stock option awards and describe variables used to test each theory. Six hypotheses are rooted in agency theory and make predictions about the incentive-intensity of compensation. The other three hypotheses are related to the financial variables of liquidity, tax status, and earnings management. They do not concern the incentive power of stock options, but rather the mix of compensation between options and cash salaries and bonuses. 3 I therefore define separate dependent variables in Section 4.1 to use for testing the two groups of theories.
Alignment of CEO wealth and stockholder returns
Theorists have long identified low levels of managerial stock ownership as a symptom of corporate agency problems. The Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) studies represent the most influential presentations of this idea and have led many theorists to argue that CEO compensation contracts should take account of executives' personal stock ownership. Therefore, CEOs with the smallest holdings of their companies' stock appear to be the best candidates for motivation by stock option awards. This conjecture leads to the hypothesis: (Hl) Incentives provided by stock option awards will decrease when CEOs hold large fractions of their own jirms' equity. This hypothesis is clouded by an implicit assumption that CEOs choose personal stock ownership positions exogenously, without regard to their firms' compensation policies. If CEO stock ownership represents an endogenous outcome of the contracting process, it may prove difficult to detect an inverse association between stock ownership and stock option awards.
Horizon problem of CEOs nearing retirement
The 'horizon problem' hypothesis predicts that CEOs nearing retirement will forgo valuable research and development (R&D) and investment projects, 3More precisely, the theories relate to the mix between stock options and all other compensation (the earnings management and tax reduction hypotheses), and the mix between all stock-based plus deferred compensation and current-period cash compensation (the liquidity hypothesis). Because stock options account for an overwhelming majority of stock-based and deferred compensation for most CEOs (see Fig. l) , and because of the difficulties in assigning current-period values to many contingent pay instruments, 1 limit my empirical predictions about compensation mix to conjectures about the value of stock option awards compared to straight cash pay. because incentive plans based on accounting data will penalize current CEOs and reward only their successors for the results of such spending (see Smith and Watts, 1982; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) . The literature predicts that corporations could counteract the horizon problem by using more stock-based compensation for older CEOs, who would thereby receive incentives to maximize firm value so long as they believed that investors capitalized the expected returns of new investments. This leads to the hypothesis:
(H2) Incentives provided by stock option awards will increase as CEOs approach expected retirement dates, as approximated by CEOs' ages.
Nature of firms ' assets
In companies with large 'growth opportunities', as defined by Myers (1977) and Smith and Watts (1992) , expected profits from future investments represent a significant portion of firm value. Numerous studies of investment decisions (e.g., Holmstriim and Ricart i Costa, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles, 1993) assume that managers hold private information about the value of growth opportunities. A further hypothesis is that as this information asymmetry grows, boards of directors have greater difficulty evaluating managers' success in choosing among investments. Therefore, companies with large growth opportunities should provide managers with more incentives from stock-based compensation, using these market-based pay mechanisms in place of salary and bonus revisions based on direct monitoring.
To test this theory empirically, I require a variable to serve as a proxy for the presence of growth opportunities. Following Smith and Watts (1992) , Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) , Gaver and Gaver (1993), and Kole (1993) , I use an approximation of the ratio of market-to-book values of firms' assets for this purpose. I define a variable approximately equal to Tobin's Q by adding together the book value of assets and the difference between the market and book values of common stock, and dividing the total by the book value of assets:
total assets (book value) + common stock (market value -book value) total assets (book value)
I use this variable to test the hypothesis:
(H3) Incentives provided by stock option awards will be larger in firms with valuable growth opportunities, as approximated by Tobin's Q. When boards of directors have difficulty obtaining clear signals of the quality of managers' decisions, they cannot make reliable decisions about revising managers' cash salaries and bonuses. In these types of firms, stock-based compensation offers an alternative to salary revisions based on direct monitoring. Lambert and Larcker (1987) analyze this problem by assuming that boards of directors receive information about CEO performance from both stock market returns and accounting earnings. They argue that CEO compensation should be tied more closely to the performance variable with the greater 'signal-to-noise ratio'. Following their model, I define a variable equal to the relative noisiness of accounting returns compared to stock returns. I calculate annual changes in return on equity (compounded continuously) for each firm and take the time-series variance of this variable during the 1984-91 sample period. I divide this statistic by the variance of stockholders' returns over the same period. I expect that a high noisiness of accounting returns relative to stock returns will cause firms to rely more heavily on stock-based incentives, leading to the hypothesis: (H4) Incentives provided by stock option awards will be higher when accounting returns contain a large amount of relative noise, measured as the time-series variance of changes in return on equity divided by the time-series variance of stockholders' returns. John and John (1993) analyze the interplay between firms' choices of compensation policy and capital structure. If managers have strong incentives to maximize the value of equity, the authors argue, debt holders will demand higher risk premia for supplying capital, for fear that managers will pursue overly risky investment projects that transfer wealth from debt holders to equity holders. John and John present a model in which equity holders find it optimal to lower the pay-performance sensitivity of managers as leverage increases in order to reduce these expected a ancy costs of debt. They predict that crosssectional data will reveal an inverse association between leverage and the intensity of managers' incentives. Therefore, I include in my model the book-value ratio of firms' total debt over total assets and use the variable to test the hypothesis:
Agency costs of debt
(HS) Incentives provided by stock option awards will decrease asjinancial leverage increases, rejecting attempts byfirms to reduce expected agency costs of debt. 
Incentives in regulated industries
Numerous theorists (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992) predict that executives in highly regulated industries will receive lower incentives from compensation or equity ownership, since the reduced range of managerial discretion in these industries diminishes the consequences of good or bad decisions. Smith and Watts identify the utility, banking, and insurance industries as heavily regulated. I therefore expect that when industry dummy variables are included in regression models, their coefficients will indicate reduced incentives from stock option awards:
(H6) CEOs in highly regulated industries will receive lower incentives from stock option awards.
Liquidity constraints
Apart from their role in providing incentives, stock options offer companies a method for economizing cash. Since stock options represent 'cashless' compensation (executives usually pay cash into their companies when exercising options), we should observe that when firms face a scarcity of cash, they substitute stock options for straight salary in their CEOs' pay packages. Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , I attempt to identify companies facing liquidity constraints by using a dummy variable equal to one if a firm pays zero dividends to its common stockholders during the last quarter of the year. For firms that do not follow quarterly schedules, this variable equals one if no dividends are paid during the year. I test the hypothesis: (H7) Companies paying zero dividends should deliver a greater fraction of CEO compensation in the form of stock options.
Tests of this hypothesis must be interpreted with caution, however, since CEOs holding stock options could be motivated to reduce dividend payments in order to increase the options' value.
Tax reduction
Stock options offer tax advantages to executives, since they generally do not result in taxable income until the year of exercise or later, and this income is often taxed at capital gains rates. For corporations, however, stock option awards might be more costly from a tax standpoint than other compensation that immediately reduces taxable income (see Scholes and Wolfson, 1992) . The possibilities for using stock options to achieve net tax savings between a corporation and its managers motivated much of the early research on executive stock options (e.g., Holland and Lewellen, 1962) . Nearly all of this research analyzes economy-wide changes in the use of stock options as a response to modifications of the federal tax code.
To test for cross-sectional differences, I require some variable to proxy for the marginal tax rates faced by different companies. I follow Clinch (1991) and others by using a dummy variable set equal to one when firms have nonzero tax loss carry-forwards. Since corporations generally have lower marginal tax rates in these situations, I conjecture that the relative attractiveness of stock options will increase compared to other forms of compensation. I use this variable to test the hypothesis:
(H8) Firms with tax loss carry-forwards should provide a greaterfraction of CEO compensation in the form of stock options.
Financial reporting costs
When reporting low levels of accounting earnings, corporations face implicit costs that range from stockholder dissatisfaction to the violation of debt covenants. Because most types of executive stock options do not result in an expense against income, companies facing large financial reporting costs might use stock options as an instrument of 'earnings management', by shifting the mix of CEO compensation toward options and away from such deductible items as cash salaries and bonuses. Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores (1992) identify interest coverage as a common proxy used to suggest the presence of large financial reporting costs, since firms with low interest coverage may have low profitability and high risks of violating debt covenants. I adopt this variable and test the hypothesis:
(H9) Firms with low interest coverage should provide a greater fraction of CEO compensation in the form of stock options.
Data description
The estimations presented below rely on a data set that tracks the compensation of CEOs in 792 U.S. corporations between 1984 and 1991. The panel represents the most important public companies in the U.S. during the sample period: To qualify, a company had to appear at least four times between 1984 and 1991 in Forbes magazine's ranking of the 500 largest U.S. corporations in any of the categories of sales, assets, net income, or market capitalization, and its common stock had to trade publicly on a U.S. exchange for at least four consecutive fiscal years in the period. While this screening process tends to favor large firms and impose some ex post survivorship bias, the restrictions are less P 7 3 w ?? Table 2 2 P Characteristics of sample companies 3 a Descriptive statistics for companies qualifying for the sample. To be included, firms must qualify for Forbes magazine's annual list of the 500 largest U.S. 2 public corporations in any of the categories of sales, assets, net income, or market capitalization at least four times between 1984 and 1991. severe than those for similar studies that use panel data, and they still permit a great deal of cross-sectional variation in the characteristics of the 792 qualifying firms. I collect data for every full fiscal year for which a company's stock traded between 1984 and 1991, even if it did not qualify for the Forbes rankings each year. The resulting panel has 5,955 observations, with annual sample sizes ranging between 704 and 778. The year in which the final month of the fiscal year lies determines its placement in the sample. Thus a fiscal year from June 1984 to May 1985 appears as an observation for 1985. In 26 cases involving 24 firms, companies changed their fiscal years, resulting in observations for transition periods which are not 12 months long. In these cases, 'flow' variables such as sales are normalized to a 12-month period. The results reported below are insensitive to the deletion of this small group of observations. When computing stock returns, if a fiscal year ends close to but not exactly on the last day of a month, the difference is ignored.
Each observation includes information about CEO compensation, equity ownership, age, and tenure, as well as company stock market performance and financial statement data. Stock market data were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Compustat provided financial statement data for most observations, and data were hand-collected for a small number of companies. Corporations' proxy statements and 10-K forms provided data for compensation and stock ownership; necessary information from these documents was obtained for all but 28 of the 5,955 observations. Some firms engaged in vague or incomplete reporting of CEO compensation and stock ownership data and refused to clarify information when contacted by the author. A common problem concerned reporting of stock option awards in three-or five-year totals which could not be disaggregated. Further, many companies reported stock option awards for periods slightly longer than one year (usually from the start of the prior year through the date of the proxy statement, two to three months past the end of the year). Unless evidence indicated otherwise, I assumed that all data reported in this manner related to the fiscal year embraced by the reporting period. As a result of these problems and occasional unreported items in financial statements, missing values occurred for approximately 4% of observations used in the analysis. Table 2 presents the characteristics of all observations, including mean levels of sales, assets, net income, market capitalization, and stock performance for each sample year, and also industry membership.
Estimation framework
The following sections develop a framework for regression models of stock option awards. Section 4.1 discusses specification of the dependent variables, and Section 4.2 lists the explanatory variables. Section 4.3 motivates a Tobit estimation approach. Section 4.4 describes a method for controlling for omittedvariable bias by using firm effects.
I. Specijcation of dependent variables
Dependent variables in the models below are based on the Black-Scholes formula for valuing European call options, as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payments:
where z = In (P/E) + T (r -d + 02/2) CiJT 1 (3) @ = cumulative probability function for normal distribution, N = number of shares covered by award, E = exercise price, P = price of underlying stock, T = time to expiration, Y = risk-free interest rate, d = expected dividend rate over life of option, G = expected stock return volatility over life of option.
The Black-&holes approach has limitations for executive stock options, since institutional restrictions limit executives' ability to hedge or arbitrage their options' values in the seondary market. For example, executive stock options are ordinarily inalienable, and executives cannot take short positions in their own firms' stock. However, the Black-Scholes equation seems far more descriptive of options' value than the approaches of some prior studies that examine the ex post paper gains earned by executives. Moreover, the Black-Scholes approach has received implicit endorsements for executive stock options from the disclosure requirements promulgated by SEC (1992) and proposed by FASB (1993). To test agency-based theories of when firms use stock options to increase CEOs' incentives, I follow the analytical framework of Jensen and Murphy (1990) , estimating the pay-performance sensitivity generated by new awards of stock options. Jensen and Murphy define pay-performance sensitivity as the change in CEO wealth per dollar change in the wealth of stockholders. For a stock option award, an estimate of pay-performance sensitivity is available from the product of two terms: the Black-Scholes formula's partial derivative This quantity provides an estimme of the change in value of a CEO's stock option award for every dollar change in the value of a firm's common equity. The partial derivative A is the well-known 'hedge ratio' used in Black-Scholes applications.
In addition to hypotheses based on incentive theories, I also test financial contracting hypotheses related to the mix of compensation between stock options and cash salaries and bonuses. For this purpose, I use the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of stock option awards divided by the cash value of salaries and bonuses.
My estimates of the Black-Scholes parameters use the following assumptions: P = price of the underlying stock at time of award. Before 1993, firms rarely reported the date of stock option awards, making it impossible to observe P. Therefore, I assume P equals E, the exercise price of the options, because firms almost universally set exercise price equal to current stock price (see, e.g., Murphy, 1985; Smith and Zimmerman, 1976) . d = ln(1 + dividend rate), with dividend rate ordinarily defined as the last dividend paid during the fiscal year, multiplied by four, divided by the year-end stock price. When companies do not pay dividends quarterly, this variable is based on the sum of the entire year's dividends. r = ln(1 + interest rate), where interest rate is defined as the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds during the last month of the fiscal year. T = life of options (in years), set equal to the longest peririd for which options may be granted according to a firm's most recently approved plan. If the maximum duration is not reported, I set the options' life equal to ten years, the duration for an overwhelming majority of awards and the limit imposed by the IRS for options to receive favorable tax treatment (see Matsunaga, 1995) . (r = annualized volatility, estimated as the square root of the sample variance of daily logarithmic stock returns during the last 120 trading days of the fiscal year, multiplied by 254, the number of trading days in a typical year.
[I checked the importance of the choice of a 120-day estimation period by reestimating volatility using ten years (or 2,540 days) of trading data; very little change occurred in regression estimates reported below.]
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I limit the valuation to new stock options, ignoring adjustments to existing options such as repricing and 'reload' options4 I include schemes providing for stock appreciation rights. I do not include plans that impose serious restrictions before stock options become exercisable, such as requiring the company to meet performance goals. My measure of incentives from stock option awards is imperfect, because it focuses on the incentives provided by new awards without considering those incentives provided by options granted in prior years. Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct reliable estimates of the incentives from CEOs' 'stocks' of accumulated option awards instead of the 'flows' of new awards, because until very recently, companies were required to disclose only the most limited data about options held and exercised by executives. Disclosure reforms promulgated by the SEC in late 1992 should allow investigators to begin assembling data about executives' portfolios of options awarded after that date, eventually permitting more complete research into incentives from stock options and other complex pay instruments. Until that time, we must rely on inexact estimates of the incentives provided by prior stock option awards. The concluding section of this paper suggests one such estimate and shows that regression results based on it are qualitatively similar to those from the 'flow' model of incentives analyzed in detail below. Table 3 lists the dependent and explanatory variables used in regression models and provides descriptive statistics. The principal explanatory variables are described in Section 2, while the dependent variables are defined in Section 4.1. The definitions of most variables are straightforward. In calculating the percentage of equity owned by the CEO, I exclude shares held contingently, such as previously awarded options, as well as those shares owned beneficially from which the CEO derives no economic benefit, such as those owned by a charitable foundation for which the CEO serves as a trustee. I calculate interest coverage as the ratio of income available for interest payments (Compustat item AFI) divided by interest expense (Compustat item XINT). If interest 4When a company has two or more CEOs during a year, I report data for the longest-serving CEO, although any stock option awards received by him may have occurred before his promotion into the CEO job. Deleting from the sample CEOs who do not serve full 12-month years (approximately 9% of the sample) results in very little change in regression estimates.
Functional form of explanatory variables
Repricing of existing stock options appeared to be an insignificant problem within the data set. Only about 1.5% of the firms reported changing the terms of previously awarded options in a given year. This low incidence of repricing matches the results from a survey of approximately 1,000 companies in SEC (1993). When firms did reprice or otherwise adjust the terms of older stock options, they rarely described the events in clear detail. Matsunaga et al. (1992) by truncating the ratio to lie between these two values. I include several additional variables in regressions to control for expected associations between stock option awards and other parameters. Many investigators have documented the influence of firm size on compensation policy; I use the natural log of total assets to measure company size. I include firms' current-year stock returns in regressions to capture any association between CEOs' current performance and the value of contingent pay they receive. I use year dummy variables to control for any time-specific trends that may have influenced option awards. Finally, I include dummy variables for CEOs serving in their first and last years, since companies may consider life cycle effects when making CEO stock option awards. 
In the model below, yi, equals the incentives provided from stock options awarded to the CEO of firm i in year z, according to the definition of pay-performance sensitivity in Eqs. (4) and (5). The latent variable index, xirp, models the decision process of boards of directors in making stock option awards; the regressions below estimate the /3 coefficients of this index. The Tobit functional form implies that observed values of stock option awards are censored at zero whenever the latent variable index plus the disturbance term pir is negative. Censored values would indicate cases where boards of directors believed CEOs' inventories of prior stock option awards provided sufficient or excessive incentives. This could occur if existing options moved so far into the money that CEOs became risk-averse to protect paper gains. The model of Haugen and Senbet (1981) accommodates such a case, requiring continuous up-and-down adjustment of option terms to maintain optimal incentives. Marcus (1982) presents a model with similar implications, noting that managers holding stock options might invest in projects which are too risky, instead of not risky enough, for stockholders' preferences. See also Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) , who simulate changes in incentives from stock options as they move into and out of the money.
Con trolling for firm effects
Many econometric studies risk encountering bias because of the possibility that omitted explanatory variables have significant influence upon the dependent variable. In studies of executive compensation, characteristics such as 'management skill' and 'corporate governance effectiveness' represent the types of variables which would be included in regressions if they could be observed and measured. Econometricians often control for omitted variables in a panel data setting by assuming they are correlated with other variables already in the model (see Chamberlain, 1984) . Because this data set contains information for a panel of firms across eight years, I introduce firm effects to proxy for companyor CEO-specific characteristics that might influence the stock option award process.
I estimate a 'correlated random effects' panel Tobit model following Mundlak (1978) . This approach amounts to a restricted version of nonlinear multivariate regression models implemented by Jakubson (1988) I model the firm-specific ci term as a correlated random effect, assuming that it can be represented as a linear combination of the average of the x, explanatory variables for each firm:
The results reported below are outcomes of pooled Tobit maximum likelihood estimations, with correlated random effects included to control for firmspecific characteristics. Because of the high danger of serial correlation in the panel data setting, I calculate robust standard errors and T-statistics.
Results
The following sections discuss estimates for both the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO stock option awards and the mix of CEO compensation between stock options and cash salaries and bonuses. Table 4 presents Tobit estimates for the model of the pay-performance sensitivity of stock option awards, with and without industry dummy variables included in the model. The results provide very little support for hypotheses that Table 4 Tobit coefficient estimates: Incentives from CEO stock option awards Maximum likelihood estimates for a Tobit model of incentives provided by annual CEO stock option awards. T-statistics robust to serial correlation appear below each coefficient estimate. The first column presents estimates with two-digit SIC dummy variables included in the model; the second column presents estimates with the industry dummy variables omitted. The sample consists of annual observations for 792 large U.S. corporations during the 198491 period. Definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables appear in Table 3 . In addition to the explanatory variables listed in the table, the model includes variables to control for firm size and current-period stock return, dummy variables for CEOs serving in their first and last years, and dummy variables for years. Table 5 presents estimates for industry dummy variable coefficients, and Table 8 presents estimates for the additional control variables. The model also controls for omitted firm effects by using a random effects framework described in the text. companies award stock options in patterns designed to reduce expected agency costs. Of the five agency-related variables in Table 4 , only one has a statistically significant coefficient estimate, and that estimate takes the opposite sign from the prediction of its associated hypothesis. Industry dummy variable estimates in Table 5 give some support to the conjecture that stock options are used less Table 6 Tobit coefficient estimates: Mix of stock option and cash compensation for CEOs
Maximum likelihood estimates for a Tobit model of the mix of CEO compensation provided by stock option awards and cash salary and bonuses. T-statistics robust to serial correlation appear below each coefficient estimate. The first column presents estimates with the industry dummy variables omitted.
The sample consists of annual observations for 792 large U.S. corporations during the 198491 period. Definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables appear in Table 3 . In addition to the explanatory variables listed in the table, the model includes variables to control for firm size and current-period stock return, dummy variables for CEOs serving in their first and last years, and dummy variables for years. Table 8 presents estimates for the additional control variables. The model also controls for omitted firm effects by using a random effects framework described in the text. Asterisks indicate significance at 5% (*) and 1% (**) levels.
intensively in certain regulated industries, as the utility dummy's coefficient has by far the lowest estimate. Table 6 presents Tobit estimates for the model of the ratio of stock option compensation over cash salary and bonus pay, again with and without industry dummy variables. Only one of Table 6 's three variables associated with financial contracting hypotheses has statistical significance: The zero dividend dummy 260 D. Yermack/Journal of Financial Economics 39 (1995) 237 -269 variable intended to proxy for shortages of liquidity is positive as expected, suggesting that when liquidity is scarce, firms shift the mix of compensation toward stock options.
Some investigators (e.g., Eaton and Rosen, 1983; Lewellen et al., 1987) prefer to study the mix of pay between cash and stock when testing agency-based theories of compensation. However, the results shown in Table 6 for a model of this type are also devoid of statistical significance.
5.1. Alignment of CEO wealth and stockholder returns I find that companies do not provide incentives from stock option awards in any significant association with the fraction of equity owned by CEOs: Table 4 's coefficients on CEO stock ownership are negative, as expected, but have T-statistics less than one. This conclusion agrees with results in Lewellen et al. (1987) , Kole (1993) , and Matsunaga (1995) , but it does not support the inverse association found by Mehran (1995) . However, it is possible that CEOs receiving stock options systematically alter their direct stock ownership in response to company compensation decisions, thereby negating my underlying assumption that the stock ownership variable is exogenous. To analyze this problem, I study those CEOs who receive nonzero stock option awards and examine changes in their direct stock ownership in the year before receiving awards, the award year, and the following year. Results appear in Table 7 . The data indicate no significant interyear changes in stock ownership transactions. The same result holds for the subsample of CEOs who receive zero stock options in the years before and after the nonzero award year.
Horizon problem of CEOs nearing retirement
I find no evidence that corporations increase incentives by offering stock option awards as CEOs approach retirement, since Table 4 's coefficients on the variable for CEO age are virtually zero. This result agrees with Eaton and Rosen (1983) , who find no significant association, but runs counter to Lewellen et al. (1987) , who find a positive and significant association.
It is possible that corporations gradually award CEOs stock options so that accumulating inventories of previously awarded options will provide increasing incentives as retirement approaches. However, further analysis (not displayed) indicates no significant differences in the ownership of vested options or stock for CEOs between the ages of 58 and 65.
5.3. Nature of jirms ' assets I estimate a negative association between incentives provided by stock option awards and the presence of growth opportunities, as approximated by the value Table 1 Changes in CEO stock ownership around year of option awards Mean changes in CEOs' stock ownership measured as a percentage of their firms' common equity. Figures include direct stock ownership only. The sample includes CEOs from a panel of 792 large U.S. corporations between 1984 and 1991. Changes are calculated from data in proxy statements (or similar documents) filed annually, shortly after the start of each company's fiscal year. Note that changes in stock ownership could occur because of vesting of shares previously owned contingently by CEOs, or because of the dilution or inflation of a CEO's ownership stake as a result of corporate transactions. The first line below presents data for all CEOs receiving stock option awards for whom sufficiently long time-series data exists to calculate stock ownership changes in both the year before and year after the award year. Since this requires two trailing years and one following year of stock ownership data, the analysis is restricted to CEOs receiving stock option awards between 1986 and 1990 who were in office for at least two years prior to and one year following the award. The second line presents data for the subset of this group who received no stock option awards in either the year before or year after the award year. In all cases the median change in stock ownership is zero. of Tobin's Q. This result, which runs counter to the prediction that companies with growth opportunities will use more stock-based incentives, accords with the 'surprising' findings of Bizjak et al. (1993) but contradicts a line of other studies that estimate a positive association (see Table 1 ). It appears difficult to reconcile these results, although the specification of the dependent variable seems to be important: Of the studies listed, only my model and that used by Bizjak et al. rely on estimates of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in firm value. Smith and Watts (1992) , Gaver and Gaver (1993), and Kole (1993) all use binary (0,l) variables to indicate the presence of stock option plans. Lewellen et al. (1987) use the value of executives' ex post paper gains on option awards, Matsunaga (1995) uses the value of stock option awards, and Mehran (1995) uses the mix of pay between equity-based plans (predominantly stock options) and other sources. Collectively, these studies' results suggest that firms with growth opportunities provide higher levels of CEO compensation, 262 D. YermackJJournal of Financial Economics 39 (1995) 237 -269 perhaps to attract managers with more talent, but that the value of compensation for these managers is relatively insensitive to subsequent performance.
My use of a market-to-book value ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities is similar to the approach of most prior studies. To check whether some other variable might indicate a positive association between growth opportunities and stock option incentives, I reestimate the model in Table 4 using the ratio of R&D spending to total assets as a proxy for the presence of growth opportunities. R&D information is available from Compustat for approximately one-third of sample observations. The estimate for this variable is virtually zero. I conclude that no evidence supports the hypothesis that firms with valuable growth opportunities use stock options to provide more incentives to CEOs.
Noisiness of accounting data
Limited evidence suggests that firms provide greater incentives from stock options when accounting earnings contain a large amount of noise relative to stock returns. To test this theory, I rely on the ratio of the time-series variance of changes in return on equity (ROE) over the time-series variance of stock returns, a variable based on the model of Lambert and Larcker (1987) . In the model that includes industry dummy variables, I estimate a positive coefficient As expected but with significance at only the 20% level. When industry dummy variables are excluded, this estimate rises slightly and becomes significant at the 9% level. The findings change little after reestimating the model using only the variance of changes in ROE, instead of the ratio of this variance over the variance of stock returns.
My weak results do not support those of Eaton and Rosen (1983) and Lewellen et al. (1987) , both of which estimate significantly positive coefficients when they measure monitoring difficulty with the time-series variance of stock returns. However, their results may be linked to the use of ex post paper gains on stock option awards as the dependent variable, since companies with the greatest variances of stock returns should also experience the greatest ex post increases in equity value, regardless of monitoring considerations.
Agency costs of debt
I find no significant association between financial leverage and incentives from stock option awards, despite the prediction of a negative relation in John and John (1993) , and counter to positive finding of Lewellen et al. (1987) . I check the importance of book values in my debt/assets ratio by reestimating the model using the market value of common equity in the denominator. The estimate remains insignificant. Dropping the model's interest coverage variable because of the danger of multicollinearity leads to almost no change in the leverage variable's estimates or their significance.
Incentives in regulated industries
Alone among the variables associated with agency-related hypotheses, certain industry dummy variables have estimated coefficients in line with theory. Smith and Watts (1992) and earlier writers conjecture that mangers in utility and financial industries receive lower compensation incentives. Table 5 's dummy variable for utility companies (SIC 49) has a negative estimate that lies almost three standard errors from the next-lowest industry. Estimates for insurance carriers (SIC 63) and other financial companies (SIC 61-62 and 64-69) also rank among those indicating lower stock option incentives. However, the estimate for banks and other depository institutions (SIC 60) lies near the midpoint of all industries.
Liquidity constraints
The significantly negative estimate in Table 6 for the dummy variable indicating nonpayment of dividends provides evevence that companies facing internal liquidity constraints shift CEO compensation from cash salaries and bonuses toward stock options. Given the average value of the dependent variable of 0.421 (see Table 3 ), the coefficient estimates of approximately 0.4 imply that the ratio of stock options to cash compensation almost doubles in firms paying zero dividends.
Managers' ability to eliminate dividend payments and thus increase the value of their stock options clouds the interpretation of this result. Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989) and DeFusco, Zorn, and Johnson (1991) have produced studies reaching opposite conclusions on whether managers systematically behave in this way. However, managers' reductions of dividends in response to option awards does not appear to explain the entire magnitude of the shift in compensation from cash toward stock options in zero-dividend firms. Simulations of changes in the value of typical CEO stock options (not displayed) imply increases of about 60% when dividend rates are reduced from 3% (a typical recent average) to zero. However, a 60% rise in option values does not account for the regression estimate of close to a 100% rise in the ratio of option to cash compensation when firms pay zero dividends.
Tax reduction
Evidence from the model does not support corporate tax reduction as an explanation for the mix of CEO pay between stock options and cash salaries and bonuses. Firms with tax loss carry-forwards are expected to award more options, since they are likely to obtain the lowest marginal tax deductions from cash compensation. The dummy variable for the presence of a tax loss carryforward has positive coefficient estimates, as expected, but with low T-statistics. Matsunaga (1995) notes that the tax advantages of executive stock options are lower when the options are awarded in the form of stock appreciation rights (SARs), which pay executives the difference between the exercise price and stock price at the time of exercise. I reestimate the model taking into account only awards under stock option plans that do not permit SARs. In this specification, the coefficient for the tax loss carry-forward variable moves even closer to zero and remains insignificant. 5.9. Earnings management I find no evidence that earnings management plays a role in corporations' use of CEO stock options. The interest coverage variable used as a proxy for the costs of reporting low accounting earnings has negative coefficient estimates, but with T-statistics below 0.7. The estimates change very little when the financial leverage variable is dropped from the model as a check for multicollinearity. Matsunaga (1995) finds some evidence that earnings management influences stock option awards. He assumes that the return on assets (ROA) follows a random walk with drift. Estimates for some (but not all) of his models indicate that firms are more likely to award a larger value of stock options per employee when ROA falls below its target level. I attempt to reproduce these results by assuming that ROA follows a random walk (but without drift, due to data limitations). When I reestimate the model, I include the one-year change in ROA as a regressor and decompose this variable into two pieces based on whether it is greater or less than zero. Neither variable's estimates come close to having significance.
Other variables
I include in both Tobit models variables expected to influence the compensation process based on the findings of prior research: firm size, current firm performance, and dummy variables for CEOs serving in their first and last years. Table 8 presents coefficient estimates for these variables in both models.
CEO life cycle considerations appear to be important in determining patterns of stock option awards. New CEOs receive especially large awards. This result supports a conjecture that lower-level executives receive less incentive compensation, since their decisions have less impact on firm value. Upon promotion to CEO, these executives receive incentives from a relatively low inventory of previously granted stock options (for CEOs recruited from outside, this inventory would be zero), and boards of directors might therefore make large option awards in CEOs' first years.
Exiting CEOs receive abnormally low levels of stock option awards. This suggests that boards pay relatively little long-term compensation to executives scheduled to leave their firms. Such a practice, however, would be at odds with Tables 4 and 5 . Second-column estimates correspond to the model of the mix of CEO compensation between stock options and cash salaries and bonuses, for which other estimates appear in Table 6 . T-statistics robust to serial correlation appear below each coefficient estimate. The sample consists of annual observations for 792 large U.S. corporations during the 198491 period. Definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables appear in Table 3 . In addition to the explanatory variables listed in the table, the model includes variables for CEO stock ownership, CEO age, Tobin's Q, the relative noisiness of accounting earning, leverage, interest coverage, and dummy variables for the nonpayment of dividents, tax loss carry-forwards, CEOs serving in their first and last years, two-digit SIC industries, and years. The model also controls for omitted firm effects by using a random effects framework described in the text. proposed solutions to the horizon problem of CEOs reducing capital spending as retirement nears. Estimates for firm size provide weak evidence of greater use of stock options by larger companies. This may occur as firm size increases because boards have more difficulty monitoring managerial performance directly, and also because larger firms are more willing to incur the fixed administrative costs of implementing sophisticated compensation plans.
Current firm performance appears to lead to a shift in CEO pay from cash salaries and bonuses and toward options. While the result is significant, the estimated coefficient has only a small magnitude; for the average CEO with a ratio of option to cash pay of 0.421, the estimate of 0.222 implies that a firm earning a 50% stock return (usually a very good year) would increase the ratio of option-to-cash pay to 0.532, an insubstantial change. The association between 266 D. YermacklJournal cfFinancia1 Economics 39 (1995) 237 269 current performance and incentives from new stock option awards is virtually zero.
Discussion and conclusions
In their comprehensive examination of CEO pay, Jensen and Murphy (1990) conclude that a 'general absence of management incentives' characterizes most CEO compensation contracts, and that observed compensation patterns are 'inconsistent with the implications of formal agency models of optimal contracting'. The findings of my study are similar in spirit. After collecting information about stock option awards for nearly 6,000 CEO-years and estimating a variety of econometric models, I conclude that six of nine leading compensation theories are not supported by the data, and one of these six is directly contradicted. The three theories that are supported are subject to qualification. Among regulated industries, utilities appear to provide lower CEO incentives through stock options, but banks rank in the middle of the pack. Companies tend to provide greater incentives from stock options when accounting earnings contain large amounts of noise; however, the effect is statistically significant only at marginal levels and is not robust to controls for interindustry variation. Liquidity-constrained firms appear to provide a greater fraction of CEO compensation from stock options, but the result may be partly due to managers' incentives to reduce dividends when they hold options.
It is possible that faulty data definitions or analysis account for my weak results. However, this study has advantages over prior research because of its large and recent sample, the use of the Black-&holes valuation approach, the controls for omitted firm effects, and the use of the Tobit maximum likelihood framework to take account of the truncated distribution of award values. Moreover, I test the sensitivity of numerous results to variable definitions by reestimating the basic models with other candidate explanatory variables.
One lingering criticism of the research design is its reliance on a 'flow' rather than 'stock' measure of CEO incentives from stock option awards. As noted above, data limitations preclude the construction of accurate measures of the incentives from previously awarded stock options. However, an approximate measure of these incentives could come from the size of a CEO's option holdings as a fraction of a company's total shares outstanding. I construct this variable by dividing vested option holdings for each CEO (the only quantity reported by most companies prior to 1993) by the number of shares outstanding at the start of each year. I repeat the analysis of agency-based contracting hypotheses by estimating a Tobit model identical to that in Table 4 . Results of this 'stock' analysis, displayed in Table 9 , are qualitatively similar to those for the 'flow' analysis of incentives from annual stock option awards. Of the five agency-based theories examined in Table 4 , only one is supported by the new model: CEOs' Table 9 Tobit coefficient estimates: Incentives from previously awarded CEO stock options Maximum likelihood estimates for a Tobit model of incentives provided by CEO's portfolios of stock options. T-statistics robust to serial correlation appear below each coefficient estimate. The first column presents estimates with two-digit SIC dummy variables included in the model; the second column presents estimates with the industry dummy variables omitted.
The sample consists of annual observations for 792 large U.S. corporations during the 1984-91 period. Definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables appear in Table 3 . In addition to the explanatory variables listed in the table, the model includes variables to control for firm size and current-period stock return, dummy variables for CEOs serving in their first and last years, and dummy variables for years. The model also controls for omitted firm effects by using a random effects framework described in the text. Asterisks indicate significance at 5% (*) and I % (**) levels.
inventories of options awarded in prior years are negatively associated with the size of their direct stock holdings, as predicted. Coefficients testing the other four agency hypotheses of option awards are not statistically significant in the 'stock' model. The results of this alternative model should be interpreted with caution, since the proxy for the stock of option-based incentives does not take into account the exercise prices or expiration dates of existing options, nor does it include
